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HUMAN FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PROFILE DESCENTS
Introduction
This study was carried out in order to provide information relevant to problems associated
with profile descents. The study had three objectives:
1. To examine critically pilot and controller problems associated with the conduct of profile
descents . .
2. To attempt, where possible, to identify human and system factors associated with these
problems •
3. To provide sufficient documentation of problems to assist cognizant authorities in seeking
solutions for these problems
The material for the study included all relevant reports submitted to the ASRS between January 1
and September 30, 1977.
Background
•During 1976, the FAA conducted an evaluation of several programs designed to minimize the
amount of time spent by high-performance aircraft in and around terminal areas. Four goals were
established for the study:
1. Increase safety by reducing exposure time between controlled and uncontrolled aircraft at
lower altitudes in the vicinity of airports
2. Reduce aircraft noise in the vicinity of airports
3. Conserve aircraft fuel
4. Standardize ATC arrival procedures
In pursuit of these goals, profile descent procedures were designed and evaluated at several
locations. A profile descent was defined as: "an unrestricted descent (except where level flight is
required for speed adjustment) from cruising altitude or flight level to interception of a glide slope
or to a minimum altitude specified for the initial or intermediate approach segment of a nonpreci-
sion approach ... (the profile descent) terminates at the approach gate where the glide slope or
other appropriate minimum altitude is intercepted."
The evaluation of profile descent procedures revealed that significant fuel savings were
possible. The opportunities to use the procedures were diminished, however, by complicating
factors such as aircraft descending at different speeds, varying conceptions of the procedures by
different operators, and lack of familiarity with the procedures by air traffic controllers (extracted
from re I". 1).
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Comments by controllers and operators led the FAA to publish standardized profile descent
procedures in the hope of standardizing usage of the procedures (ref. 1). The first publication,
containing profile descents for Denver, appeared in December, 1976. The Denver profiles were
revised and profiles for Atlanta were added in February, 1977; subsequent revisions have included
changes in the manner of presentation of the profile descent data and addition of procedures for
Miami and the San Francisco areas. Chicago has implemented similar descent procedures, but
without publishing charts; other areas are preparing procedures for implementation in the immedi-
ate future.
Reports received by ASRS have indicated that certain problems exist in connection with the
implementation of these procedures. It is important to note that there is virtually no disagreement
with the concept, which appears to offer important advantages with respect to noise, fuel economy,
and exposure time at lower altitudes (three of the FAA's expressed goals). Critical comments have
been confined to the areas of procedures, charts, and human factors.
Approach
All ASRS reports dealing with profile descents and received between January 1 and Septem-
ber 30, 1977 were reviewed. Additional materials used for the study were the NOS and Jeppesen
profile descent charts issued between December 2, 1976, and October 6, 1977, fact sheets issued by
certain ATC facilities, and correspondence and memos relating to profile descents, copies of which
were made available to ASRS by organizations within the aviation community.
A total of 59 relevant reports was submitted to ASRS during the 9-month period. Pilots
submitted 39 and ATC controllers submitted 20. Sixteen reports were concerned with the Denver
area, 38 were concerned with profile descents at Atlanta, and 5 were concerned with other areas or
general problems. Forty-three reports described occurrences involving-human errors and 16 reports
described potential problems related to profile descent procedures. The sections that follow
describe the occurrences in terms of outcomes, enabling and associated factors, and the concerns of
those who submitted informational reports. Table 9, following this chapter, summarizes the classifi-
cation of each occurrence in terms of outcome, enabling and associated factors, and other relevant
data.
Results
Geographic locations— The specific arrivals/profile descents discussed in those reports are
listed in table I. No clear preponderance of reports dealing with a specific procedure was observed,
although the absence of reports involving the Denver BYSON approach is noteworthy.
Pilot and controller errors— Forty-three reports described errors or alleged errors by pilots and
controllers: of those, 39 were errors by pilots (including two allegations of error not concurred in by
the reporter). A breakdown of these errors is shown in table 2.
Thirty-three of 37 confirmed pilot errors involved al t i tude deviations. There was an almost
even distribution of overshoots nnd undershoots, which together comprised about two-thirds of the
errors. Deviations from profile heading usually occurred about ten miles from the DME arc at which
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TABLE 1.- PROFILE DESCENT PRO-
CEDURES CITED IN REPORTS
TABLE 2.- PILOT AND CONTROLLER ERRORS
Denver
Kiowa
Drako
Keann
Byson
Unknown/
nonspecific
6
5
2
0
3
16
Atlanta
Sincac
LaCrangc
Rome
Macey*
Unknown/
nonspecific
10
9
8
7
4
38
"Original name Sinclair, changed on April 21,
1977.
Original name Lanier. changed to Lanie on
April 21, to Macey on June 16.1977.
a turn was mandated by the pro-
cedures. Three of four controller
errors involved a potential conflict
with less than standard separation
between aircraft.
Factors associated with
errors— Each occurrence report was
evaluated to determine whether it
described human, machine, or
system factors associated with and
relevant to the occurrence. A com-
plete listing of the factors isolated
is shown in the appendix. Factors
were classified as "enabling" or
"associated" on the basis of the cri-
teria described in previous reports
(rcf. 2).. Enabling factors arc sum-
marized in table 3, associated fac-
tors in table 4.
Situation rcfiorts— A number
of reports provided information
regarding profile descent problems
but did not describe .specific occur-
rences. The subject matter of these
16 reports is dcserilx-d in table 5.
Type of error
Pilot errors
Altitude deviations
Altitude overshoot
Altitude overshoot (alleged)
Altitude undershoot
Altitude excursion
Altitude misread, corrected
before overshoot occurred
Deviation from profile heading
Controller errors
Less than standard separation
Failure to hand-off aircraft
Number of reports
14
2
12
6
35
4
39
3
1
4
43
TABLE 3.- ENABLING FACTORS IN PROFILE DESCENT
REPORTS
Factor
Pilot
Utilized wrong chart
Misread correct chart
Misunderstood clearance
Misunderstood clearance amendment
Received clearance late
Misunderstood rules or procedures
Misread aircraft instruments
Maintained inadequate descent rate
(Report indicates allegations were incorrect
Controller
Misunderstood <.'cveloping situation
(training)
Did not require clearance acknowledgment
Did not transfer control of aircraft
Gave instructions not followed by aircraft
Number of citations
12
9
6
4
3
1.
1
I
2)
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TABLE 4.- ASSOCIATED FACTORS IN PROFILE DESCENT
REPORTS
Factor Number of citations
Human factors
High workload
Distraction
Training/unfamiliarity
Misunderstanding of rules/procedures
Fatigue
Misread aircraft altimeter
Software factors
Chart complexity/clutter
Procedural complexity/ambiguity
Aircraft factors
Clearance exceeding aircraft descent
parameters in idle/clean configuration
Aircraft system malfunction
Environmental factors
Thunderstorms in immediate area
Turbulence
Frequency congestion
Communications problem, unspecified type
7
7
5
3
1
J
4
4
4
1
4
2
2
1
24
TABLE 5.- SUBJECT MATTER OF INFORMATIONAL
REPORTS
Topic Number of reports
Pilot reports
Workload involved in profile descents
Ambiguities in profile descent procedures
Arrival/departure conflict
Refutation of alleged potential conflict
Controller reports
Arriv.il/dcp3rture/enroutc conflicts
Descent rates: effect on RDP readout
Phraseology problems
Problems dur ing profile descents at OKD
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Discussion
It is obvious that a majority (75%) of these reports involve human errors'during the conduct of
profile descents. How many were submitted in order to support a claim for waiver of disciplinary
action is impossible to determine, although controller reports indicate that altitude "busts" during
profile descents are comparatively common:
Aircraft A was inbound on a profile descent for runway 27L from over Tiroe
intersection. When the aircraft was approximately 20 miles southwest it descended
out of 11,000 ft. There were departures climbing to 10,000 ft, but the closest one
was 7 miles away. Since the profile descent procedure was started in Atlanta, this
type of pilot deviation has been happening every day.
Aircraft A was on a profile descent to runway 9R from over Tiroe and was
supposed to cross the 25 DME southwest at 8000 ft, but crossed it at 9100 ft ...
This is an ongoing problem that started when profile descent procedures were
established in Atlanta....
Aircraft A was cleared for a Macey runway 26 profile descent and should have
crossed 25 DME northeast at 10,000 ft. A crossed 25 DME at 12,000. This deviation
was — verified by the pilot ... no evasive action was required. This situation is, and
has been, an everyday occurrence since profile descents began in Atlanta. It has now
reached the point where controllers will not report these violations; they are still
occurring frequently despite numerous earlier reports. Pilot education is the only
solution to this situation. It must be pointed out to the pilots that we are basing
separation on their making these crossing restrictions. I have personally volunteered
my own time to conduct pilot-controller forums ....
It is certainly possible to assume that these errors simply represent inattention, or a lack of
precision; sonic have used the term "complacency" in connection with such errors.
It is instructive, however, to attempt to discover whether there are common threads in this
fabric of error reports. Is it possible to discern problems that are common to many or all of them?
Specifically, arc there factors associated with these errors, the alleviation of which might make the
errors less likely or of less potential gravity from a safety standpoint? The data in tables 3, 4, and 5
can be restructured to assist in this examination, as shown in table 6.
Five areas appear to warrant detailed examination on the basis of the grouping shown in
table 6. Putting aside the human factors for a moment, the system factors, in order of frequency,
are charts, clearances, procedures, and aircraft. Each will be discussed briefly.
Profile (k-xrcui diarts— These comments do not relate to charts prepared by the National
Oceanic Survey (NOS): fc\v air carrier pilots use NOS charts, and no specific comments were made
about them. Twenty-live percent of the enabling and associated factors in this study related to
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TABLE 6.- PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PROFILE
DESCENTS
arrival and profile descent charts,
however; certain errors were asso-
ciated with their use.
In these reports, the most fre-
quent problem was a pilot's use of an
incorrect altitude datum, taken in
haste from the wrong one of two
charts on a single page. Profile des-
cents for opposite direction runways
are ordinarily printed on the same
plate to minimize the number of pages
that must be carried. The problem with
this is that limitations on the two des-
cents may be similar, but not identi-
cal. In a recent survey (ref. 3), pilots
indicated a strong dislike for the large
number of extra plates which the pro-
file descent program entails, yet it
appears from these data that two
plates on a page may also present a
problem-
Several errors were due to mis-
reading a datum from the correct
chart. These errors, in the main, were
of three types:
*
1. Reading (and then flying to) a
minimum enroute altitude instead of
crossing altitude
2. Misreading an altitude limita-
tion
3. Misreading the DME distance
for a fix and departing the profile
course (usually early rather than late)
Situation (1) was reported in this
scries only once, but other data have
made it clear that it has happened a
number of times (refs. 3 and 4). Situa-
tion (2) was reported several times,
and occasioned an examination of a number of current (October 6, 1977) profile descent charts to
determine the number and typos of altitude limitations used in different areas. Table 7 illustrates
this.
Problem area
Profile descent charts
Used wrong chart
Misread correct chart
Chart complexity/clutter
Profile descent clearances
Clearance misunderstood
Clearance amendment misunder-
stood
Late clearance
Clearance phraseology problems
Nontransfer of aircraft control
No acknowledgment of clearance
Instructions not followed by aircraft
Profile descent rules/procedures
Misunderstood rules/procedures
Complexity or ambiguity of rules
Arrival/departure conflicts
Aircraft operations in profile descents
Inadequate descent rates
Descent rate effect on RDP readout
Clearance exceeds descent
parameters
Human factors in profile descents
Workload factors (pilot and
controller)
Distraction
Problems during profile descent test
Misread aircraft instruments
Effect of aircraft malfunction
Fatigue
Training/unfamiliarity
Effect of environmental factors
Communication problem
Allegations, not supported)
Table
3
12 :
9
6
4
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
(2)
Table
4
4
3
4
4
7
7
1
1
1
5
8
1
Table
5
1
2
4
1
6
1
-
(1)
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In the survey referred to (ref. 1),
several pilots pointed out that provid-
ing a "window" (limitation 4) or a
"floor" (limitation 3) gives " pilots
more latitude than requiring a crossing
at a "hard" altitude (limitations 1
and 2) during the descent. It was also
pointed out in the survey and in our
reports that hard altitudes require
constant adjustments of speed and/or
power, and that they do not take
account of variations in wind velocity
at various altitudes. Other pilots, how-
ever, remarked that single or hard alti-
tudes were easier to remember in a
complex procedure.
TABLE 7.- ALTITUDE LIMITATIONS ON PROFILE
DESCENT PLATES
Altitude limitation
1. "Cross (alt/flight level)"
Z "Cross at (x)" (see
footnote)
3. "Cross at or above (x)"
4. "Cross at or above (x);
Cross at or below (y)"
Number of plates examined
Average number of limitations
per plate
SFO
OAK
SIC
1
16
20
3
15
2.7
ATL
8
4
8
8
2.5
DEN
17
4
16
16
2.3
MIA
8
•3
2
8
1.6
x = altitude/flight level.The presentation of minimum
enroute altitude (MEA) data on pro-
file descent plates has been a matter
of discussion since early in the profile descent program. The original Denver plates contained them;
the original Atlanta plates did not. It has been pointed out that profile descents are published routes
and that MEA information is therefore needed in the situation where a profile descent is cancelled
in favor of a visual approach clearance; on the other hand, in most such situations pilots would
deviate from the profile course after such a clearance was received. Regardless of the differences
between the MEA and crossing restriction altitude depictions, which are now substantial, pilots
continue to mistake one for the other on occasion:
Upon crossing Keann intersection, while making Keann arrival for runway 17 at
Denver, I looked at the arrival chart for next crossing restriction. My eye immedi-
ately picked up the 11,000 ft MEA which is shown on the chart between Keann and
Bowen. I stated that this was the altitude we could descend to and my co-pilot
verified the altitude. Prior to reaching 14,000 ft we discovered our error. The way
the minimum cnroutc altitude and restriction are shown on the chart makes it very
easy to confuse the two. I don't sec any reason for the MEA's to be on the charts.
Chart complexity or "clutter" was identified as contributing to four errors in this study. The
profile descent charts vary considerably in complexity, for several reasons. One is that in certain
locations, the transition, arrival and profile descent procedures have been combined, whereas in
other locations, the arrival and profile descent are separate procedures (albeit with almost the same
names), require separate clearances, and are depicted on separate charts. The Miami charts, which
incorporate transition data, are quite complex, though the profile descents to that airport are the
simplest of those examined (table 8).
In July 1977. the NOS profile descent charts appeared in a new, oversize format which groups
four profile descents leading to a single group of runways on a single chart. These charts represent
an innovative approach to certain of the problems cited here, notably that of avoiding the use of
data intended for use during approaches to the reciprocal runway. They are comparatively
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TABLE 8.- SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS0 WHICH
MUST BE OBSERVED FOLLOWING
INITIATION OF PROFILE DESCENTS
Location
San Francisco
Oakland
Denver
Atlanta
San Jose
Miami
Procedures
6
4
16
8
5
8
Mean
7.7
13
63
5.5
5.2
4.8
Range
6-9
6-9
6-8
5-6
4-6
4-6
^Heading, airspeed, or altitude limitations
following initiation of the profile descent
procedure.
uncluttered. They are used by relatively few pro-
fessional pilots, however, and ASRS reports
contain no comments regarding them. Certain of
the Jeppesen profile descent charts for San Fran-
cisco occupy a full page; the presentation on these
pages is also less cluttered than on some of the
dual-procedure pages.
Profile descent clearances— As in previous
studies of ASRS data (ref. 2), misunderstood clear-
ances or clearance amendments were associated
with errors during profile descents. Eight such
cases were examined to determine, where possible,
the content of the message that was
misunderstood.
It was found that the most common misunderstanding was that pilots, having been told to
expect the ABC profile descent and cleared for the ABC arrival, and in some cases given later
instructions which corresponded to the initial profile descent instructions, believed that they were
to continue the profile descent, when in fact they were not cleared to do so:
... At a point just north of Rome VOR, on the 357 radial, a heading was
assigned to this flight to intercept the Rome Six Arrival southeast of Rome VOR. In
addition, the flight was told to "Expect a Rome-Runway 26 Profile Descent." The
copilot was flying this leg and responded accordingly. While proceeding outbound
from Rome VOR on the 132 radial, further instructions were given. The flight was
to descend and cross the ATL VOR 9 DME fix on the 313 radial at 11,000 ft and
210 knots indicated (no clearance for the Rome 26 profile descent had been given
even though the instructions followed the profile descent plate). As the flight
approached the 9 DME fix with no further clearance, the captain asked what
Approach Control's intentions were. They responded with instructions to turn to a
90° heading and descend to 5,000 ft. (Again, this followed the profile descent plate,
but no actual clearance for this profile had been given.) During this stage of the
descent, the flight was told to maintain 6,000 ft and given another heading. More
headings followed during the descent. Finally, Approach Control questioned our
altitude and I immediately noticed that the copilot had descended to approximately
5,600 ft (400 ft below the newly assigned altitude of 6,000 ft). He initiated a climb
and regained the 400 ft
Contributing factors: (1) The flight was told to expect a Rome-Runway 26
profile descent and was never given it; (2) Approach Control's instructions followed
the published descent profile and then suddenly varied; and (3) cockpit distraction
existed due to the variance of instructions between the flights as far as the profile
descent was concerned and due to turbulence in the area. Also, we did not know
what runway the vector was for since no runway profile descent had been
assigned ....
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A controller also spoke to this point in an informational report:
The Big Sur STAR with runway 28 Profile Descent procedures appear to be
confusing to many pilots as many flights are questioning or violating the procedure.
The phraseology developed for. profiles, "Cleared via Big Sur Arrival, expect
runway 28/19 profile descent, maintain ...," seems to adequately cover the require-
ments of ATC with the profile procedures although it has not been made mandatory
nor is it published in handbook 7110.65. It appears that the pilots are not familiar
with the PROCEDURAL NOTES contained in the P-2 FLIP and are often misinter-
preting the phraseology being used. •
The phraseology and the procedure should be assimilated to insure a nationally
standardized usage understood by pilots and controllers alike. The procedural notes
in the P-2 must be reinforced with all pilots to insure rigid compliance, specifically
the notes pertaining to "... a routing clearance and not authorization for the pilot
to comply with depicted altitude..." and, "DO NOT DESCEND TO PROFILE
DESCENT ALTITUDES UNTIL CLEARED BY ATC."
Another misunderstanding, more common during the early days of the program, was whether
subsequent instructions do or do not void a profile descent clearance:
We were cleared for a Lanier-runway 8 profile descent to Atlanta by Center —
at 14,000 ft and 40 DME from ATL we reported to Approach Control at 14,000 ft
and he replied- "Roger, maintain 14,000." Over Loan intersection we started a
descent to 11,000ft. After reaching 11,000ft I reported that fact to Approach
Control and received "Do you intend to descend any lower?'"' I informed him that I
was complying with the descent profile. He replied "You were cleared to maintain
14,000." I told him that I thought I was cleared for the profile descent and he
replied "maintain 11,000." In retrospect, I now see that his statement "Maintain
14,000" voided the profile clearance even though he did not state the. profile was
cancelled ... This appears to be a confusing trap for the pilots flying this type
STAR.
Aircraft A was cleared for the LaGrangc 9R profile descent to Atlanta ... The
flight crossed the 40 DME fix at 14,000 and continued descending. Approach
Control advised that aircraft A would be vectored for an ILS approach to runway 8.
Aircraft A requested and was granted direct routing to the runway 8 LOM. The pilot
in command of aircraft A contends that the clearance direct to the runway 8 LOM
voids the runway 9L profile descent: Since implementation of the profile descents
Approach Control has cancelled them whenever they have found it necessary to
deviate even slightly from the published procedure ....
Late clearances or amendments pose a considerable problem for pilots constrained by the
relatively indexible limits of the profile descent procedure. Two reports illustrate the dilemma in
which the pilot finds himself, particularly when a late amendment or other modification of the
profile-procedure voids his planning and strategy:
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I may have violated a FAR by crossing a profile descent point at the wrong
altitude on a scheduled airline flight from DAB to ATL. ATL ATIS gave runways 8
and 9L in use. Approaching ATL I was cleared Sinca 8/9L profile descent and
commenced the profile descent observing the altitudes. When nearing the ATL
25 DME fix, I was cleared foe a 26/27L profile descent. Since I was to cross the
D8/ATL fix at 11,000ft with the previously cleared 8/9 L profile descent I was
placed in an untenable situation in that I was cleared for the 26/27 L profile descent
too late to comply with the D26/ATL altitude of 8000ft and 210 knots. ATL
Approach is prone to changing runways and approaches from those which one can
expect from ATIS and previously indicated plans.
We were making a Sinca arrival into Atlanta from the Dublin VOR- Center had
already cleared us to 18,000, then to 14,000. When we were approximately 60 miles
from the ATL VOR and at about 20,000 ft, descending at 2500-3000 ft/min and
350 knots, Center cleared us for a Sinca profile descent to runway 26/27L. After
giving this clearance, the Center added "Cross the 40 DME at 250 knots." The
profile descent requires crossing the 45 DME at or above 14,000 ft with no airspeed
restriction, then crossing the 25 DME at 8000 ft and 210 knots.
We were unable to slow down and cross the 25 DME at 8000. Center was aware
of our crossing the fix at-about 8800 ft as they said "See you did not make the
crossing altitude, but that's ok, contact Approach Control." Several factors contrib-
uted to our inability to make the crossing altitude:
1. The current wide-body aircraft cannot slow down and descend with any
degree of rapidity at the same time. Even with the use of full in-flight spoilers, it
requires a great deal of distance.
2. At any of these flap settings and limiting speeds, the best rate of descent is
about 2000 ft/min.
3. ATC personnel are not familiar with the performance limitations of the
various aircraft.
4. Profile descent altitudes and airspeeds require almost the maximum perfor-
mance capability of the aircraft and leave little margin.
5. The profile clearance in this case was late in delivery and the speed
restriction, delivered even later, made compliance impossible ....
If ATC procedures are going to continue to require high descent rates while
decreasing air speed, this should be considered when designing flaps and other drag
devices nnd their operating speed limits ....
Pilot comments make it plain that they are quite comfortable about flying profile descents as
charted (although the apeed restrictions at high altitudes at Denver provoked several unfavorable
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comments in view of the stated purposes of the program). Pilots also point out, however, that
subsequent additions to the already complex profile descent procedural constraints, in the form of
additional headings, altitude or speed restrictions, make a demanding task very much more
demanding and divert the attention of all cockpit crew from the other tasks which must also be
accomplished during the descent and approach phases of flight:
During the execution of the Kiowa runway 26 profile descent, constant and
mostly uninterrupted ATC controller radar vectoring was encountered by this flight
and an estimated six other IFR aircraft approaching the airport. The excessive
vectors, altitude changes, and airspeed reductions (other than those published)
required by the profile descent method of enroute-approach transition unnecessarily
complicate the cockpit workload during this critical phase of flight prior to
ILS/gltdepath intercept. Checklists must be completed. Approach speeds must be
computed and the instrument approach navaids must be identified during this phase
of flight. Unnecessarily frequent radio transmissions during the terminal descent are
undeniably distracting and therefore degrade aviation safety
Profile descent rules and procedures— A perceptive informational report to ASRS encapsulates
effectively many of the concerns in pilots' and controllers' reports to ASRS concerning profile
descent rules and procedures. It should be recalled that there are air carrier pilots who in the course
of a single trip may conduct profile descents at as many as four terminals, each of them having
procedures and charts somewhat different from all of the others:
— Most of all, I feel that inconsistencies from one terminal to another
terminal result in procedures that are difficult for even the most experienced airline
and corporate pilots - even though any one ... person believes his profile descent is
better than those found at another location, we believe all profile descents should be
almost the same. It is (in) that spirit that we highlight many differences in this
(report). Additionally, we wish to point out some discrepancies observed by many
pilots who have flown profile descents.
. . .Reference SFO runway 19 PD (Big Sur): The note "Descend at
330 knots from FL230 until required to reduce to 250 knots" appears
only at SFO and no other terminal.
... Reference SFO runway 29 PD (Modesto): There is no computer code
for the STAR portion of the profile descent. The STAR route from
Modesto is actually MOD4 although (this is) not stated ... Persons
arriving by INS ... direct to MOD then via the PD have no way of filing
for this route
... Reference SFO runway 28 PD (Big Sur): Same situation .. . prompted
one pilot not to accecp Big Sur arrival because it was labeled Profile
Descent and not the Big Sur Arrival.
. . . Reference DUN Keann One Arrival, DF.N runways 8L and SR Keann
Profile Descent, OAK runway 29 Profile Descent (Modesto): By compari-
son, it can he seen that STARs are in effect at Denver and are to be used
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prior to (referring to) the appropriate Profile Descent. All ... STAR
transitions are part of the STAR — Looking at ... Oakland ... all
transitions, STAR and profile descent are all on one page. Even though
more apparent clutter is on the single page, the pilot needs to (use) only
one page — all the way to the instrument approach ....
Some profile descents start as low as 10,000 ft while others start at
FL250. In cither case, pilots have asked "Why?" Also, pilots don't
necessarily know when and where to begin their descents out of cruising
altitudes ....
... (At Denver) a speed restriction of 250 knots is required 57 miles from
the threshold ... at an altitude as high as FL230. Most other PDs don't
require the 250-knot restriction until 10,000 ft
— (At Miami) The Falso runways 9L and (R PD's have their) first speed
and altitude restriction — only a short distance from the runway. Most
others start at the first PD fix.
... The first altitude restriction on some PDs states "Cross at...," others
state "Cross at or above —," while others use a window Why so many
differences? (Note: see table 7.)
There have been so many changes to the rules for profile descents that
(we got a) new bulletin ... for each new cycle
.. . Reference DEN runways 26L and 26R Keann PD: The radar vector
route from Burty intersection proceeds south and then turns inbound on
the 26L localizer. This has been interpreted by pilots to mean that they
should turn inbound when their navigational instruments show them
(approaching) centerlinc (rather than awaiting further vectors) ... some
pilots and some controllers disagree on what (is correct)....
..-.Reference SFO runway 28 PD (Modesto and Point Reyes): Fora
while, PD's were called "STAR with Profile Descent procedure" but are
now being changed to "Profile descent procedures
...Reference DEN Drako One Arrival and SFO runway 28 PD
(Modesto): Since the Denver and Atlanta STARs are separate, many items
of text appear on"the pages, whereas at SFO, the STARs have no narrative
route descriptions ... .
... Reference SFO runway 28 PD (Modesto): Although it is not readily
apparent, the PD begins at Modesto for traffic arriving on the Fresno
transition. The I'D begins at the MOD R-064/11 DM1Z for traffic .. . from
the oilier transitions ....
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It seems to us that in order to achieve standardization for ... profile descent
procedures, and to achieve a common understanding by controllers and pilots as to
what is expected of them, certain actions must be taken for standardization
purposes, an Agency Order/Handbook (should) be developed so that runway profile
descents will be similar at all locations — (as has been done for SIAPs) .
Some sort of a document needs to be prepared with input from all affected
organizations that can provide the necessary educational material on runway profile
descents for pilots, controllers, and operators. This is not something that should be
prepared on a "crash" basis; (it) should be thoroughly developed and agreed to, so
that amendments — would be required only at very infrequent intervals
— We certainly agree with the profile descent concept, but feel it has gotten
off to a poor start
Four informational reports related to possible conflicts between arriving and departing traffic.
One concerned Denver and was reported to FAA shortly after the program began in December,
1976. The other three all involved the Atlanta Sinca profile descent; extracts from them are shown:
ATC cleared flight for Sinca profile runway 26/21L descent. This has a
25 DME fix, crossing altitude of 8000ft. Approximately Smiles from the fix,
Approach Control advised "You should be at 8000 ft now; we cross aircraft there at
. 9000 ft." If this is true it appears his map and DME position do not agree. At any
rate, we were out of 9300 ft descending when he said this. We cross the intersection
at 8000 ft. These are very close tolerances; too close, considering the aircraft speeds.
The profile descent procedure — from the south (from over Dublin) allows
the aircraft to enter Macon Approach Control's airspace ....
It appears that crossing restrictions on the Sinca profile descent may not
provide separation from departures from Atlanta. Our procedures leave doubt as to
who is responsible if pilots do not or.corjiot make restrictions
Aircraft operational problems— One controller report pointed out that certain profile descents,
especially if initiated late, may require high ntes of descent, and that when descent rates exceed
about 4600 ft/min. the controller is deprived of altitude information:
... The other RDP related prcrlem is the altitude readout going to XXX
during a climb or descent. Data Systerss says that the problem is caused because the
al t i tude logic check is set nationally j; about 4600 ft per minute ... Any time an
uircrjft exceeds the parameter, the co—puter will assume that there is an error and
will not display the al t i tude. The proivjm here is that with the high profile descents
being ins t i tu ted across the 'country. :~ere will be more altitudes going to XXX as
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more pilots participate in the program. If this becomes the rule rather than the
exception, then the altitude readout function (will) lose a lot of its usefulness ....
Several pilot reports indicated that clearances can exceed aircraft capabilities. This appears to
be a particular problem with one type of aircraft, but several pilots anticipated problems during the
coming winter, when higher power settings will be required to maintain aircraft and nacelle de-icing.
— This profile descent is just a little tight to make, as you cross 45 DME fix at
14,000 ft and the 25 DME fix at 8000 ft and 210 knots. With ... a tailwind, this
will be even tighter
... Current wide-body aircraft cannot slow down and descend with any degree
of rapidity at the same time. Even with the use of full in-flight spoilers, it requires a
great deal of distance . —
... When crossing the 45 DME/ATL 128 radial at or above 14,000 ft as
required on the Sinca runways 26/27L profile descent, you cannot make the
25 DME at 8000ft and 2IOkias using normal descent procedures. My aircraft
descends at approximately 1000 ft/3 miles at idle power, clean; 14,000 minus 8000
equals 6000 ft times 3 equals 18 miles just to descend. At normal descent speed of
350 kias, it takes 7 miles to show to 250 knots at 10,000 ft (airspeed at 25 DME is
to be 210 knots).
The only way to make these crossing restrictions is to be way below normal
descent speed at the 45 DME fix, reverse the inboard engines ... or slow to flap
speed at 14,000 (220 knots for 0-15 flaps) and descend with flaps down
Human factors in profile descents— The preceding discussion has dealt primarily with system
problems as they affect the pilot during profile descents. This section is devoted to a brief
consideration of what those effects are, and of how they arc viewed by pilots and controllers.
Two human factors were often cited in these reports: workload and distraction. The profile
descent is a relatively demanding, time-paced task consisting of from four to nine specific control
subtasks (table 8) during a period of 5—10 min. To this fairly complex tracking task is added the
tasks of completing the approach/descent checklist, any communications that "are required, the
resetting of navigational radios, and any other subsystem operations necessary during this phase of
flight. AH of these tasks, except communications, require visual as well as intellectual attention, as
does the very necessary task of maintaining a lookout for other aircraft in visual meteorological
conditions:
Received clearance for a profile descent into Denver. Informed Center unable
to comply with clearance because we could not make the first crossing restriction.
We were told to make a left 360° turn. While in the turn, Center gave me the profile
descent clearance again. I told them I didn't want to accept it. They said "If you
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don't like it, call this phone number after you land" ... We were so busy reading the
profile descent plate that we could not look out the windows at all during VFR
conditions. Center would not give us a verbal clearance so we could fly the airplane
with our eyes and use our ears to get the instructions — we must use our eyes to
understand the clearance at the same time we use our eyes to fly the airplane ....
Most profile descents as presently configured require the almost undivided attention of one
pilot, and a considerable amount of monitoring by a second crew member. It appears that under
these conditions, it is the outside lookout that suffers most:
... The Denver profile descents have so many altitude and speed restrictions
over so many points that the major attention of the crew is directed at checking the
crossing points and altitudes and speeds — too little time is spent watching for
other aircraft, thus increasing the hazard of midair collisions beyond acceptable
limits. —
' To these tasks may be added the additional task of complying with vectors or additional speed
restrictions or altitude restrictions. Under these conditions, cockpit workload may exceed for a time
the flight crew's ability to stay ahead of the situation:
My comments are on descent profiles — I find that (they) are not working the
way they were supposed to work these profiles impose a greater workload on the
pilots, expecially in a two-man crew Another point is that there are so many for
•each airport that they distract us from cockpit duties, especially in bad weather —
From my point of view, the descent profiles may ease the controller's workload, but
it makes aircraft workloads much higher. In the descent, most of the time at peak
hours, they break down with vectoring back and forth to the profile, and it can get
messy ... I have never done a profile descent (as written) to completion, out of
probably 15 ....
It is believed that such periods of overload may be a major factor in the instances reported
lierc of misreading of charts or cockpit instruments, glances at incorrect charts, etc. When
unfamiliarity or training is an added factor, as in six cases, still another element is added to the
crew's workload:
— I was pilot in command ... with additional duty of conducting initial
operating experience training for the first officer — this was his first flight in this
capacity. The flight was routine — arriving in the Atlanta area we encountered
some large buildups in the vicinity of Macey intersection, requiring deviation east of
course. Following hand-off to Approach Control, and after crossing the ATL041
radial 40 DME fix, a runway 8/9R profile descent was initiated as clarcd. I flew the
aircraft with first officer assisting. The ATL 20 DME fix was crossed at
11,000/250 kias; shortly after crossing this fix 1 began reducing speed to arrive at
the 9 DM I: fix at 210 knots. Al this point I made a severe error by misinterpreting
the procedure, started descent too early and crossed the 9 DME fix too low .. . Air
traffic was fiiirly heavy with frequent radio contacts; calls were replied to by first
officer and myself when first officer was unable due to cockpit duties ....
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Finally, environmental or aircraft system problems beyond the control of the pilot may
increase workload further. A strong tailwind decreases the time available for the task and requires
that the aircraft be flown closer to its prescribed descent limits. Turbulence increases the difficulty
of the tracking task. Thunderstorms near -the route of flight require the pilot to operate and
monitor radar in addition to his. other tasks. Aircraft subsystem problems can be a potent
distracting factor:
Scattered to broken thunderstorms east of Denver with bases at
8,000-10,000 ft; approaching Denver from ISO direct Kiowa, Kiowa One arrival.
Cleared for Kiowa runway 26 profile descent. Our crew purposely studied Denver
profile descents the night before the flight as we had not executed the full ...
procedures before. We reviewed the charts once again during cruise. We executed the
profile descent without any problems except having to ride through bases of
thunderstorms intermittently.
Our main concern — is that it took complete attention inside the cockpit to
cross-check the altitude crossing restrictions ... speed restrictions, not including
possible speed adjustments for turbulence ... The chart as flown is a very rapid
exercise in heading, course, altitude, and speed changes requiring continuous cross-
checking — Pilot not flying spends his entire time changing radios (navaids and
communications). The second officer is cross-checking both pilots plus reading
checklists and performing his normal duties. We found that none of us had time to
scan outside the cockpit enough to see any conflicting traffic. We feel that these
profile descents — have increased the cockpit workload during the flight phase
when it should be decreased ... add weather and/or an emergency and you have an
accident waiting to happen ..
We were at an improper altitude over two fixes during a profile descent.
Problem was discovered when I realized that I was looking at descent information
for cast landing profile instead of west. Action taken was to increase descent rate
abruptly to get to proper altitude. No evasive action was necessary. The factors that
contributed to the situation were that both profiles are on the same side of the page.
The first officer was assisting the second officer with a prcssurization problem and it
was my seventh day on duty in a row ... you cannot know your failing point until
you fail ....
It is worth noting that workload and distraction factors were cited in several controller reports
as well. This is not a problem only for the pilot:
Controller and trainee were working final approach and the new profile descent
was being utilized. Airline A was on downwind descending to 5000 ft. Light air-
craft B was northbound and level at 6000 ft. B was issued clearance to 4000. At this
time the controller's and trainee's attention was with other aircraft near the airport.
An effort was being made to "shoot the gap" with a small aircraft (VFR). The
instructor had planned to use south runways for landing after coordination with
tower. The trainee did not understand this and questioned the decision. Tower also
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talking to us on the override. At that point I saw aircraft A leaving 6200 on a
converging course with B who was leaving 5800. Aircraft A was issued a turn for
separation; they were two miles apart and the turn was too late ... profile descents
allow aircraft to enter congested areas with too much speed ....
At 2129Z I relieved controller on sector 15 interphone and radar. He briefed
me on ... aircraft A landing Stapleton ... and aircraft B, a Denver departure
climbing to FL220 deviating around thunderstorms ... in the arrival and departure
gates ... After working with some other traffic in the southeast part of the sector
... I observed A and B to be head-on ... I believe I never had less than standard
separation. After listening to the voice recording, I determined why A did not stop
at FL230. The controller I relieved did clear A to FL230 after an earlier clearance
for a profile descent; however, when the controller released his microphone switch
after giving the amended clearance, the pilot of A was also on the frequency in the
middle of a sentence ... the pilot never heard the amended clearance and so an
acknowledgment was never received by the controller ....
These are all factors that confront professional pilots and controllers on a daily basis. They are
proud of their ability to cope with whatever confronts them. It should be noted, however, that the
final approach phase of flight, a very high workload period under difficult conditions, has received
much.attention with regard to presenting as few distractions and additional tasks as possible. All air
carriers insist that the final phase of the approach be stabilized, in part for the same reason.
Certain profile descents demand the same order of precision as the final approach, but pilots
may be subjected to far more in the way of distracting stimuli during this phase of flight. If cockpit
workload during the descent is increased by profile descent procedures, and there is abundant
evidence that it is, then ways must be found to ensure that this workload is not further increased by
more than the necessary minimum of other system, communication, and ancillary tasks, or further
navigational tasks or procedures.
General Discussion
It is necessary to recall that a great manyprofile descents arc being dawn without incident on
a daily basis. Their successful accomplishment is rarely reported to ASRS. The problems discussed
in this report may not be representative, although they are in close accord with the findings of
others and with the comments of highly experienced air carrier observers with whom the profile
descent program has been discussed. Finally, the reports on which this study is based, like all ASRS
data, represent only the perceptions of the reporters, unsupported by independent investigation. On
the other hand, these perceptions appear to have a high degree of consistency, just as do the errors
that occur during profile descents.
It is understood that steps are being taken to correct certain of the problems described here.
This report covers only the period through October 6, 1977. It is hoped that it may be of assistance
to those responsible for the program by pointing out some of the human factors aspects of the
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program as initially implemented, and of help to the pilots and controllers involved in the program
by helping them to be aware of pitfalls that may contribute to human errors during the conduct of
profile descents.
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